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Abstract
An investment decision problem is studied, in a framework where the government
offers insurance against the possibility of the price of a risky asset falling drastically.
The problem is considered under different informational scenarios, i.e., information
quality, under which agents have to infer the state of fundamentals of the economy.
Changes in information quality is shown to affect equilibrium prices despite no
concomitant changes in the fundamentals, creating excess volatility. The possibility
of government intervention is shown to increase equilibrium prices, which can be
ordered as a function of information quality. Empirical evidence supporting the
model is presented.
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Government Insurance, Information, and Asset Prices
Abstract
An investment decision problem is studied, in a framework where the government offers insurance
against the possibility of the price of a risky asset falling drastically. The problem is considered
under different informational scenarios, i.e., information quality, under which agents have to
infer the state of fundamentals of the economy. Changes in information quality is shown to
affect equilibrium prices despite no concomitant changes in the fundamentals, creating excess
volatility. The possibility of government intervention is shown to increase equilibrium prices,
which can be ordered as a function of information quality. Empirical evidence supporting the
model is presented.
Keywords: Government insurance, information quality, asset prices.
JEL classification: E32, E44, G01.
1. Introduction
During crises episodes, the course of action of the government is always subject to a great deal
of controversy. No consensus is ever achieved between those who, on the one side, champion the
idea of government intervention and those who, on the other, believe in the self-correcting force
of markets. Ex-post, government intervention might be required, if the state of affairs is not to5
be aggravated; ex-ante, if government intervention is taken for granted whenever bad outcomes
happen, risks might be taken in excess.
The way the government behaves in crises episodes has an impact on the payoff of virtually
any asset. The reason is that, at least to some degree, there is always a correlation between an
asset’s payoff and the state of fundamentals of the economy - those factors that indicate how10
well the economy is performing, and the very same factors the government aims at upon an
intervention. Affecting assets’ payoffs, the government turns out to play an important role in the
investment decision of agents, which in turn affects the demand for assets and, consequently, their
prices. Assets’ prices are part of the state of fundamentals, causing the action of the government
to feed back into itself. Figure 1 illustrates this process.15
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Figure 1: Impact of government intervention and feedback effect.
One example of the process above is the case of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in the
financial crisis episode of 2008-2009. MBS are securities whose payoffs derive from a pool of
mortgages, assembled together an issued as a single asset, a process known as securitization.
Securitization creates a secondary market for loans, which helps financial institutions in the
transfer of risks, making it easier for them to offer new mortgages.20
Of prominent role in this secondary market is Fannie Mae, a company created by the U.S.
government in 1938, with the goal of fostering the level of home ownership. Initially established
as a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE), it was converted into a publicly traded company
in 1968. This change of ownership altered its government guarantee status, from being explicit
pre-1968 to being implicit pos-1968.25
This implied government guarantee would constitute arc number 1 in Figure 1. Since the
payoff of a MBS is dependent on the payment of loans it embeds, it is an instrument with a great
deal of credit risk. Therefore, the support from the U.S. government conferred to the securities
traded by Fannie Mae a lot of appeal, increasing the demand for them, which would be arc
number 2.30
Given an active secondary market for loans, and a fierce competition for new customers in a
business deemed profitable at the time, a plethora of credit became available to those willing to
take a mortgage, and together with that came a decrease in lending standards. The increased
demand for houses arguably inflated a bubble, arc number 3, and, when the high level of prices
could not be sustained anymore, those disqualified borrowers had no ways of fulfilling their35
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obligations. By the time, a great fraction of the mortgage market was owned by Fannie Mae,
whose collapse would pose a serious threat to all of those invested in assets like MBS, making
government intervention inevitable, arc number 4, completing the process depicted in Figure 1.
Defining a scenario by the precision of the signals received by the agents of the economy,
the effects from the possibility of government intervention should be related to how precise the40
information available to the agents is. For, agents considering to invest in a risky asset would
value more the possibility of an intervention in a scenario with less informative signals, since
accurate signals would allow for a decision to be taken regardless of the policy chosen by the
government: if the economy will perform well, agents buy the risky asset, otherwise they just
invest in the riskless one.45
Following this logic, the goal of the paper is to study the effects on equilibrium prices of a
policy whereby the government can intervene during a financial crisis, and how these effects are
related to the scenario, or precision of information, under which assets are transacted. Not only
that, the aim is to compare how those effects change when the government is able to commit to a
policy of no intervention. In the setup to be presented, the criterium used by the government to50
intervene is the social welfare of the agents, defined by the total sum of their portfolios’ payoffs.
A financial crisis happens whenever this measure goes below a critical level, which results in the
government intervening and the social welfare being restored to the critical level.
The problem faced by the agents is to form a portfolio that can consist of a riskless asset and
an indivisible risky asset. The payoff of the risky asset is assumed to be perfectly correlated with55
the state of fundamentals of the economy, modeled as a uniform random variable on the unit
interval. The scenario in which agents make their decisions fall into one of the following three:
(i) imperfect information, where each agent receives a noisy private signal of the future payoff
of the risky asset, (ii) perfect information, where every agent knows what the payoff of the risky
asset will be and, (iii) common prior, where all that is known is the probability distribution of60
the future payoff of the risky asset.
In terms of government intervention, two frameworks are studied, one where agents entertain
the possibility of intervention, to be called the government intervention framework, and another
one where agents rule out that possibility from the outset, the no government framework 1.
In order to understand the effects from the interaction between agents’ precision of informa-65
1From now on, framework is related to the possibility or not of government intervention, whereas scenario
refers to the precision of the information held by investors about the future payoff of the risky asset.
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Figure 2: Framework and Informational Scenario Comparison.
tion and the possibility of intervention, the equilibrium price for each combination of scenario
and framework is derived and compared to each other, as illustrated in Figure 2. Among the
results obtained, it is showed that (i) the possibility of government intervention raises equilib-
rium prices, no matter what the informational scenario under which agents form their portfolios;
(ii) equilibrium prices cannot be sustained at particular high levels, and; (iii) the possibility of70
government intervention matters only when the uncertainty faced by the agents is sufficiently
high.
The reason why the possibility of government intervention raises equilibrium prices is that it
operates as an insurance, in particular when the agents consider to buy the risky asset. If agents
are to pay too high of a price for the risky asset, though, the strategy will be profitable only75
at high realizations of the state of fundamentals. Given the uniform distribution assumed, such
realizations are less likely, and therefore agents will choose to invest their entire endowment in
the riskless asset. Thus, an equilibrium in which the risky price is transacted at high prices will
fail to hold.
That the possibility of intervention matters only when the uncertainty faced by the agents is80
sufficiently high shows how pervasive can changes in the quality of information be, and how the
possibility of government intervention can amplify the effects from that. For instance, compared
to the framework with no possibility of intervention, the models predicts jumps in asset prices
when agents entertain the possibility of the government stepping in and the precision of the
information held by agents deteriorate, causing more volatility in prices.85
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1.1. Related Literature
The paper relates mainly to two strands of literature, one analyzing the effects of the quality
of information on assets prices, and another studying the consequences for asset pricing of the
possibility of government intervention during crises.
Regarding the effects of the quality of information on asset prices, models were developed and90
empirical studies were performed focusing on the implications for interest rates and bond prices
(Dothan and Feldman (1986), Feldman (1989)), portfolio choice (Genotte (1986), Detemple
(1986)) stock market fluctuations and predictability of asset returns (Barsky and DeLong (1993),
Timmermann (1993), Wang (1993), Veronesi (2000), Brennan and Xia (2001), Ai (2010)), effects
of central bank and stock exchanges transparency (Rhee and Turdaliev (2013), Ke et al. (2013)),95
and cost of equity capital (He et al. (2013)), among others. Most of these papers, particularly
the theoretical ones, explore a dynamic setting where learning plays a crucial role, differently
from the present paper which is developed in a static setting with no updating of information
whatsoever. Another difference is that, whereas the aforementioned papers explore questions
related to stock returns, the interest here is on the level of stock prices.100
Another strand of the literature that also touches on the issue of the relation between infor-
mation quality and asset prices is that of ambiguity, as surveyed in Guidolin and Rinaldi (2013).
Particularly relevant to the present paper is Epstein and Schneider (2008). Despite not explicitly
considering the possibility of government intervention, Epstein and Schneider show that infor-
mation quality can have negative effects on asset prices even when fundamentals do not change,105
a result that is also obtained here.
Models of ambiguity can also explain market non-participation, by modeling agents as having
ambiguity aversion preferences (Cao et al. (2005), Antoniou et al. (2014)). The model to be
presented shows that another explanation can be added to that: even with perfect information,
agents may prefer not to participate in the market if prices get too high, since that signals a110
likely poor return on the investment in case it is made.
In terms of the effects arising from the possibility of government intervention during crises, in
particular financial ones, the literature addresses questions regarding optimal policy, e.g., interest
rate versus bailout interventions (Farhi and Tirole (2012), Diamond and Rajan (2012)), banks’
ex-ante choice of liquidity (Acharya et al. (2011)), incentives for failure Acharya and Yorulmazer115
(2007), bank runs Ennis and Keister (2009), effects on option prices (Kelly et al. (2012)), central
bank’s policy impact on Tobin’s q (Faria et al. (2012)), and consequences of monetary policy
shocks (Tsai (2014)), to cite a few. Apart from the analysis of Kelly et al., none of these papers
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addresses the question of how government’s intervention policy affect the level of equilibrium
prices, which is the main focus here.120
In the model to be developed, agents might have information which makes them unaware
of the intervention decision of the government. However, there is no uncertainty whatsoever
regarding the policy to be followed by the government in case an intervention does happen,
a question pursued by Pastor and Veronesi (2012) and, indirectly, by Gospodinov and Jamali
(2014). Regarding the model of Pastor and Veronesi, whereas the assumption of uncertainty125
about both government’s action and their impact leads to excess volatility in asset returns,
unawareness about intervention leads to excess volatility in asset price levels in the present
paper.
The empirical section of the paper assumes that consumer sentiment has an effect on asset
prices, and this effect relates to the characteristics of the assets, which here are defined in terms of130
the quality of the information available. Similar to that is the analysis in Corredor et al. (2013),
where a comparison of investors’ sentiment effect on stock prices is carried out considering also
country-specific characteristics.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 introduces the model, with the correspond-
ing measure of social welfare upon which the government bases its intervention decision; section135
3 focus on the framework where investors entertain the possibility of government intervention,
with the following subsections dealing with the different informational scenarios: imperfect in-
formation, perfect information and common prior; analogously, section 4 refers to the framework
where investors acknowledge the absence of the government; section 5 compares the equilibrium
prices across frameworks (with and without the government) and across scenarios (imperfect,140
perfect and common prior information); empirical evidence supporting the model is presented in
section 6; section 7 concludes. The derivation of some of the results is delegated to the appendix.
2. Model
The model consists of a continuum of agents, represented by the unit mass interval, I = [0, 1],
facing a static decision problem. There are four dates, t = 0, 1, 2, 3, and the sequence of events145
that unfold is:
• t = 0: nature draws the state of fundamentals θ from a uniform distribution θ˜ ∼ U [0, 1];
• t = 1: agents decide whether to buy or not, Xi = 1 or Xi = 0, respectively, a single
unit of an asset that has a future payoff equal to the realized state of fundamentals. The
6
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Government
observes welfare
and decides
whether
to intervene
Agents
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their portfolios
and consume
the proceeds
Informational scenario
(imperfect, perfect,
or common prior)
Framework
(with or without
intervention)
Figure 3: Timeline of events.
information about the state of fundamentals is revealed to the agents according to the150
informational scenario:
– Imperfect information scenario: agents receive a noisy private signal about the realized
state of fundamentals;
– Perfect information scenario: agents receive precise information about the realized
state of fundamentals;155
– Common prior scenario: agents know only the probability distribution of the state of
fundamentals, and this information is common knowledge.
• t = 2: the government decides whether to intervene or not, according to the framework:
– Government framework: the government anticipates the social welfare level (to be de-
fined) that results from agents’ investment strategies and decides whether to intervene160
or not;
– No government framework: no intervention whatsoever ensues since the government
is absent from the outset.
• t = 3: agents liquidate their portfolios and consume the proceeds arising from that.
Figure 3 illustrates the timeline of events. The asset is in unitary supply, and every agent is165
initially endowed with wealth A. In case the price of the asset is p, buying is affordable if and
only if A ≥ p. Without buying, an agent just carries over her initial endowment to the last date
of the economy. All the consumption occurs at the final date, as a function of the investment
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strategy chosen. Agents are risk neutral and their utility is represented by the payoff of their
investments’ strategy given by:170
R (Xi, θ, A) ≡ Xiθ +A−Xip = Xi (θ − p) +A, ∀i ∈ I. (1)
If an agent chooses to buy, Xi = 1, she gets the payoff from the asset, θ, plus whatever is
left from the initial endowment after the asset was purchased, A− p. On the other hand, by not
buying, Xi = 0, an agent keeps her total endowment, A, for later consumption.
In the framework with the presence of the government, intervention occurs whenever social
welfare goes below a certain threshold, C. Social welfare, S, is defined as the sum across the175
agents of the proceeds from their investment strategies, before the government decides whether
or not to intervene, expressed as:
S (θ) ≡
∫ 1
0
R (Xi, θ, A) di =
∫ 1
0
[Xi (θ − p) +A] di. (2)
The condition for intervention is:
S (θ) < C. (3)
If this condition is satisfied, the government intervenes and social welfare is restored to C.
Together with the market clearing condition,
∫ 1
0
Xidi = 1, this implies that, whenever there is180
government intervention, the state of fundamentals that the agents of the economy will end up
facing is θ∗, given by:
S (θ) = C ⇔ θ = C −A+ p ≡ θ∗. (4)
Thus, the condition for the government to intervene is met whenever the realization of θ˜ is
sufficiently low, i.e., θ < θ∗. The interesting case is when A > C, for whenever the government
steps in the resulting state of fundamentals is such that agents cannot fully recover the amount185
invested: from (4), conditional on government intervention, the strategy of buying the asset
yields θ∗ − p = C − A < 0. Also, A < C would imply government intervention even when no
agent invests, which is not plausible given the measure of social welfare chosen.
Summarizing, the problem faced by each agent is to build a portfolio whose future payoff
depends not only on the state of fundamentals of the economy, but also on the decision of the190
government to intervene or not, which in turn is a function of social welfare. The possibility of
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intervention affects agents’ problem since it works as an insurance mechanism, as it is shown in
the sequence.
3. Framework with the Possibility of Intervention
In the framework with the presence of the government, agents are aware of the possibility195
of intervention. Since government’s action affects the payoff of the risky asset, when building
their portfolios agents need to determine the probability of an intervention happening. Beliefs are
formed in accordance with the informational scenario at hand, i.e., imperfect, perfect or common
prior information as described in Section 2. The imperfect information scenario is analyzed first.
3.1. Imperfect Information200
In the imperfect information scenario, each agent i receives a noisy private signal ξi about
the state of fundamentals. Signals are uniformly distributed around the realized value, ξ˜ ∼
U [θ − τ, θ + τ ], with τ > 0. Agents know that θ is at most τ units away from the signal received,
i.e., θ ∈ [ξi − τ, ξi + τ ], ∀i ∈ I. Agents’ problem is then:
max
Xi
U (Xi; ξi, A, p) ≡ E
[
Xi
(
θ˜ − p
)
+A | ξi
]
= Xi
[
E
(
θ˜ | ξi
)
− p
]
+A (5)
s.t. A ≥ p if Xi = 1, ∀i ∈ I.
An equilibrium is defined as:205
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a collection of decision rules, X =
{
Xi |Xi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i ∈ I
}
,
and price p ∈ R++, such that:
(i) given price p and private signal ξi, Xi ∈ argmax {U (Xi, ξi, A, p) |A ≥ p if Xi = 1}, ∀i ∈
I; and
(ii) market clears:
∫ 1
0
Xidi = 1.210
Agent i’s signal ξi conveys information not only about θ but also about the likelihood of
government intervention. When deciding whether to buy or not the asset, each agent asks what
is the probability of intervention conditional on the information received, i.e., the probability
that θ < θ∗ conditional on θ ∈ [ξi − τ, ξi + τ ]. This probability in turn depends on the price of
the asset, since θ∗ is a function of p as defined in (4).215
Given p, for each agent i one of the following three possible cases hold:
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(I) C −A+ p ≤ ξi − τ ;
(II) ξi − τ < C −A+ p ≤ ξi + τ ;
(III) ξi + τ < C −A+ p .
In (I), it follows that C − A + p = θ∗ ≤ θ, since θ ∈ [ξi − τ, ξi + τ ] . Therefore, conditional220
on the price being p and having received a signal ξi such that (I) holds, agent i knows that there
will be no government intervention. Thus:
E
(
θ˜ | ξi
)
=
1
2τ
∫ ξi+τ
ξi−τ
θdθ (6)
= ξi. (7)
In (II), agents cannot rule out the possibility of government intervention and, accordingly,
they calculate the expected value of the state of fundamentals as:
E
(
θ˜ | ξi
)
=
1
2τ
[∫ C−A+p
ξi−τ
θ∗dθ +
∫ ξi+τ
C−A+p
θdθ
]
(8)
=
1
2τ
{
(C −A+ p)
[
1
2
(C −A+ p)− (ξi − τ)
]
+
1
2
(ξi + τ)
2
}
. (9)
Finally, in (III) agents know that there will be intervention, resulting in:225
E
(
θ˜ | ξi
)
=
1
2τ
∫ ξi+τ
ξi−τ
θ∗dθ (10)
= C −A+ p. (11)
Given all the three possible cases, the objective function in (5), Ui (Xi; ξi, A, p), can be rewrit-
ten as:
Ui (Xi; ξi, A, p) = Xi
[
E
(
θ˜ | ξi
)
− p
]
+A
= XiI(I)ξi
+XiI(II)
1
2τ
{
(C −A+ p)
[
1
2
(C −A+ p)− (ξi − τ)
]
+
1
2
(ξi + τ)
2
}
+Xi
{
I(III) (C −A+ p)− p
}
+A, ∀i ∈ I, (12)
where I(I) is the indicator function for case (I), namely I(I) = 1 if C − A + p ≤ ξi − τ and
zero otherwise, and similarly for I(II) and I(III).
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Agents can secure their entire wealth for consumption in the final period, and since they230
must satisfy a budget constraint, the optimal strategy will be Xi = 1 in case the following two
conditions are satisfied:
Ui (1; ξi, A, p) ≥ A, (13)
A ≥ p. (14)
Using (12), inequality (13) can be equivalently written as:
I(I)ξi + I(II)
1
2τ
{
(C −A+ p)
[
1
2
(C −A+ p)− (ξi − τ)
]
+
1
2
(ξi + τ)
2
}
+I(III) (C −A+ p) ≥ p. (15)
Hence, assuming that the budget constraint is satisfied, condition (15) is the pivotal one in
determining whether an agent chooses to buy the risky asset or not. The equilibrium price is235
the only variable endogenously determined in the definition of θ∗, and thus to each equilibrium
price there is an associated likelihood of government intervention given by θ∗. The equilibrium
price and the likelihood of government intervention are two sides of the same coin, determined
jointly.
According to the price, p, the corresponding critical level of intervention θ∗ falls in one of the240
following intervals:
(i) 0 ≤ C −A+ p ≤ θ − 2τ ⇔ 0 ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ − 2τ ;
(ii) θ − 2τ < C −A+ p ≤ θ − τ ⇔ θ − 2τ < θ∗ ≤ θ − τ ;
(iii) θ − τ < C −A+ p ≤ θ ⇔ θ − τ < θ∗ ≤ θ;
(iv) θ < C −A+ p ≤ θ + τ ⇔ θ < θ∗ ≤ θ + τ ;245
(v) θ + τ < C −A+ p ≤ θ + 2τ ⇔ θ + τ < θ∗ ≤ θ + 2τ ;
(vi) θ + 2τ < C −A+ p ≤ 1⇔ θ + 2τ < θ∗ ≤ 1.
In intervals (i), (ii) and (iii), intervention does not occur in equilibrium, whereas in intervals
(iv), (v) and (vi) it does. One would expect an equilibrium to be more likely to emerge in the
intervals associated with a higher θ∗, after all those are the ones where investing in the asset is250
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supposedly safer due to a higher possibility of intervention. However, it is also true for those
cases that the price to be paid to acquire the asset, p, is higher, making the buying decision
less attractive. It is the interaction of these two opposite effects that ultimately determines the
overall likelihood of having an equilibrium in a particular interval.
Moving from interval (i) to (vi), agents’ uncertainty, or unawareness, changes from being255
related to the fact that the government does not intervene to the fact that the government
does intervene. From interval (i) to (iii), accurate signals indicate that the government will not
intervene, whereas from (iv) to (vi) accurate signals indicate that the government will intervene.
In intervals (i), (ii) and (iii), government intervention does not take place in equilibrium
and no agent mistakenly believes that such an intervention would certainly occur. The mass of260
agents knowing exactly what the government behavior will be gets progressively smaller, as one
goes from interval (i) to (iii). For instance, in interval (i), everyone knows the government will
not intervene, in (ii) a fraction of the investors knows there will not be intervention and in (iii)
a relatively smaller mass of agents acknowledges that the government will not intervene, even
though this is what happens in equilibrium.265
In intervals (iv), (v) and (vi), government intervention does take place, with no agent mis-
takenly ruling out such a possibility. Differently from the previous intervals, however, the mass
of agents who know exactly what the government behavior will be gets progressively larger, as
one moves from interval (iv) to (vi). In interval (iv), some agents know that the government
will intervene, in (v) a relatively larger fraction of the investors acknowledges that and in (vi)270
everyone knows how the government will react.
Formalizing the argument, recall that intervention ensues if and only if θ ∈ [0, θ∗), and that
agents receive noisy private signals distributed as ξ˜ ∼ U [θ − τ, θ + τ ]. Agents therefore know
that θ ∈ [ξi − τ, ξi + τ ], to be called individual range of uncertainty, for each agent i ∈ I.
The union of the individual ranges of uncertainty,
⋃
i [ξi − τ, ξi + τ ], is [θ − 2τ, θ + 2τ ], to be275
called total range of uncertainty. In interval (i), it holds that 0 ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ − 2τ , hence no agent
believes in government intervention since [0, θ∗) ∩ [θ − 2τ, θ + 2τ ] = ∅. In (ii) and (iii), on the
other hand, [0, θ∗)∩ [θ − 2τ, θ + 2τ ] 6= ∅, and since θ∗ increases as one moves along the intervals,
the fraction of agents unaware of the fact the government does not intervene becomes larger.
In intervals (iv) and (v), no agent can rule out the possibility of government intervention,280
since for both it is true that [0, θ∗) ∩ [θ − 2τ, θ + 2τ ] 6= ∅. Again using the fact that θ∗ increases
with the intervals, the fraction of agents aware of the fact the government does intervene becomes
larger, the extreme case being interval (vi), where everyone knows what the government’s course
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
1
0 θ − 2τ θ − τ θ θ + τ θ + 2τ 1 θ∗
Degree
of confusion
no intervention
Unawareness of
intervention
Unawareness of
Figure 4: Level of uncertainty as a function of θ∗.
of action will be: (θ∗, 1] ∩ [θ − 2τ, θ + 2τ ] = ∅.
A measure of the level of unawareness of government’s equilibrium action, defined as the285
fraction of investors that is uncertain about the behavior of the government, i.e., intervention
or not, is depicted in Figure 4, called degree of confusion. According to the previous discussion,
the degree of confusion is a function of the critical level of government intervention, θ∗.
In deriving the equilibrium price, the magnitude of the dispersion parameter τ relative to
the downside risk A − C is the key factor defining the functional form of p. The high (low)290
uncertainty case is the one where τ > (<)A − C. Recall that τ is the parameter that defines
how disperse is the range of uncertainty of each agent, and also the support of the distribution of
signals: a higher τ means both that investors contemplate a larger interval where the realized θ
might lie and also that the signals are more spread out. The characterization of the equilibrium
price according to the dispersion parameter τ is given in Table 1.295
Uncertainty level, τ Price Functional, p
τ > A− C p = θ +
[
A− C − 2
√
τ (A− C)
]
τ < A− C p = θ − τ
Table 1: Equilibrium price as a function of the dispersion parameter.
The effects on the equilibrium price, p, of changes in the state of fundamentals θ, wealth A,
insurance C and dispersion parameter τ are given by:
(i) pθ > 0;
13
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(ii) pA < 0;
(iii) pC ≥ 0;300
(iv) pτ < 0.
The equilibrium price of the risky asset is increasing in both the state of fundamentals and
the insurance provided by the government, whereas it is decreasing in the wealth of investors
and the dispersion parameter. The only counter-intuitive of these results relates to p decreasing
in the wealth A of agents, and the reason for that is twofold. First, agents can only buy a single305
unit of the risky asset, thus the demand for it does not necessarily increase when agents become
wealthier. Second, agents are allowed to carry their entire endowment for future consumption,
so increasing its level makes choosing the riskless asset more attractive relative to buying the
risky one.
Another result is that no equilibrium price exists such that the critical level of government310
intervention, θ∗, lies in interval (vi), where it would be at its highest. Equivalently, no equilibrium
price exists such that every agent is aware that government intervention will ensue. For, agents
would be paying too high of a price to purchase the risky asset, and only upon an unlikely high
realization of the state of fundamentals such a strategy would be worth. Facing a high price,
therefore, investors prefer to abstain from buying the asset, which results in the market clearing315
condition not being satisfied and an equilibrium failing to hold.
This non-existence of equilibrium could be related to the burst of a bubble, indicating the
impossibility of prices being supported at extremely high levels. As bubble burst episodes are
related to a lack of demand to keep prices increasing, so it is this non-existence of equilibrium
also caused by an insufficient mass of investors willing to buy the risky asset, despite high prices320
signaling a higher probability of government intervention in case the risky asset performs poorly.
3.2. Perfect Information
In the perfect information scenario, agents know the realized state of fundamentals, θ. Based
on the price of the risky asset, they acknowledge if an intervention will follow or not. The critical
level of government intervention, θ∗, leads to one of the two following outcomes:325
(i) 0 < C −A+ p ≤ θ ⇔ 0 ≤ θ∗ ≤ θ;
(ii) θ < C −A+ p ≤ 1⇔ θ < θ∗ ≤ 1.
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In (i) the government does not intervene, whereas in (ii) it does. Investors’ maximization
problem is:
max
Xi
Xi (θ − p) +A (16)
s.t. A ≥ p if Xi = 1.
Therefore, in case agents can afford to buy the asset, A ≥ p, they choose Xi = 1 only if330
θ − p+A ≥ A, or equivalently, if θ ≥ p. If this is the case, A > C implies that:
[p, 1] ∩ [C −A+ p, 1] = [p, 1] , (17)
whereas
[p, 1] ∩ [0, C −A+ p) = ∅, (18)
which means that an equilibrium can be supported only in the range where there is no
government intervention.
The reason why an equilibrium cannot be supported when agents anticipate an intervention335
by the government is the same as in the imperfect information scenario, i.e., they acknowledge
that the price of the risky asset is too high and therefore it is not worth to buy it. This implies
that the market clearing conditions does not hold, and hence an equilibrium fails to exist.
Defining pPI as the equilibrium price in the perfect information scenario, in equilibrium it
follows that pPI ≤ θ. As a benchmark for comparison later, one takes the equilibrium price in340
the present informational scenario to be:
pPI = θ, (19)
which is the maximum price investors would be willing to pay knowing the government will
not act.
Following the expression of the equilibrium price, the comparative statics are straightforward:
the price is increasing in the state of fundamentals. There is no downside risk to be considered345
by the investors since they know what the payoff of the asset will be. Because of that, the wealth
level A and the government insurance parameter C do not appear in the equilibrium price and
thus do not matter in terms of comparative statics.
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3.3. No Information: Common Prior About the Fundamentals
The common prior scenario refers to the case where the only information known by the agents350
is the distribution of θ˜, given by θ˜ ∼ U [0, 1]. Agents’ problem is now:
max
Xi
E
[
Xi
(
θ˜ − p
)
+A
]
= Xi
[
E
(
θ˜
)
− p
]
+A (20)
s.t. A ≥ p if Xi = 1.
As usual, agents acknowledge that intervention takes place only if θ < θ∗, a condition which
is equivalent to θ < C −A+ p, as in (4). Also, agents know that, upon government intervention,
the state of fundamentals is set at θ∗. Hence:
E
(
θ˜
)
=
∫ 1
0
θdθ =
∫ C−A+p
0
θ∗dθ +
∫ 1
C−A+p
θdθ
=
1
2
[
1 + (C −A+ p)2
]
. (21)
In case agents can afford to buy the asset, A ≥ p, they choose Xi = 1 only if:355
1
2
[
1 + (C −A+ p)2
]
− p+A ≥ A
⇔
1
2
[
1 + (C −A+ p)2
]
− p ≥ 0. (22)
Taking the constraint in (22) to be binding, the equilibrium price in the common prior
scenario, denoted by pCP , is given by:
pCP = 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
. (23)
With pCP as the equilibrium price, the fact that θ∗ ∈ [0, 1] requires A − C < 1/2, and with
that one has the following comparative statics of the equilibrium price:
(i) pCPA < 0;360
(ii) pCPC > 0.
As before, the only counter-intuitive result is the equilibrium price decreasing in the wealth
of investors. The explanation is the same given previously: an increase in A makes the option
of saving the entire wealth for future consumption more attractive, and, together with the fact
that agents are allowed to buy at most one unit of the risky asset, it holds that pCPA < 0.365
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3.4. Equilibrium Prices Across the Informational Scenarios
After deriving the equilibrium prices prevailing in each informational scenario, this section
proceeds with the intra framework, inter scenario analysis of Figure 2. By ranking the equilibrium
prices across the informational scenarios one can assess the impact of information on asset prices.
The equilibrium prices to be compared are:370
(i) Imperfect information:
• pIP = θ +
[
A− C − 2
√
τ (A− C)
]
(high uncertainty);
• pIP = θ − τ (low uncertainty).
(ii) Perfect information: pPI = θ;
(iii) Common prior: pCP = 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
.375
As mentioned in the derivation of pCP in (23), an extra assumption required is 0 < A−C <
1/2. With this assumption in place, it is shown in the appendix - Propositions 3 and 4 - that the
ordering of equilibrium prices across the informational scenarios will depend on the realization of
the state of fundamentals. In particular, for both cases of low uncertainty and high uncertainty,
i.e., low and high levels of τ , there exists θ and θ such that, for a sufficiently high level of the380
state of fundamentals θ, i.e., θ ∈
[
θ, 1
]
, the ordering of equilibrium prices is given by:
pPI > pIP ≥ pCP , (24)
whereas for an intermediate level, i.e., θ ∈
[
θ, θ
)
, the ordering is:
pPI ≥ pCP > pIP , (25)
and, finally, if the state of fundamentals is sufficiently low, i.e., θ ∈ (0, θ), it follows that:
pCP > pPI > pIP . (26)
For any level of θ, therefore, the equilibrium price under perfect information, pPI , is higher
than the one prevailing in a scenario of imperfect information, pIP , which reflects the value of385
having accurate information about the state of fundamentals of the economy. On the other hand,
if investors only have knowledge of the distribution of θ˜, the expected state of fundamentals they
envisage is higher than the true one when the realization of θ is low, and the converse when the
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realization of θ is high. This leads to pCP > pPI > pIP whenever θ ∈ (0, θ), and pPI > pIP > pCP
when θ ∈
[
θ, 1
]
.390
The ordering of equilibrium prices shows that changes in the informational scenario faced
by agents leads to changes in asset prices even without a concomitant change in the state of
fundamentals. This is important because it highlights the fact that the environment where trade
occurs, with its specific information structure, can create volatility in asset prices that otherwise
would not be warranted.395
As a thought experiment, consider the case where information is not disseminated properly
in the economy, leading agents to make their decisions based only on the knowledge of the
distribution of returns of the risky asset. If one considers the fundamental price of the risky
asset as the one prevailing in the perfect information scenario without informational frictions,
then the model says that positive bubbles would exist when the state of fundamentals is low and400
negatives bubbles when it is high, since in the former case one has pCP > pPI , whereas in the
later pPI > pCP . In terms of government policy, therefore, one implication of the model would
be that measures aiming at improving the quality of the information known by the agents would
lead to a correction in prices.
4. Framework without the Possibility of Intervention405
In the framework with the absence of the government, agents rule out the possibility of
intervention from the outset, regardless of the realization of the state of fundamentals. As for the
framework with the possibility of government intervention, this section derives the equilibrium
prices under different informational scenarios, which are then compared to each other. The
imperfect information scenario is discussed first.410
4.1. Imperfect Information About the Fundamentals
In the imperfect information scenario with no possibility of government intervention, it follows
from (6) that E
(
θ˜ | ξi
)
= ξi, and from (15) that agents opt to buy the risky asset only if ξi ≥ p
and the budget constraint is satisfied, i.e., A ≥ p. The market clearing condition is:
1
2τ
∫ θ+τ
p
dξ = 1 ⇔ θ + τ − p = 2τ
⇔ p = θ − τ ≡ pNG.
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Hence, the higher the dispersion parameter, τ , the lower the price of the risky asset emerging415
in equilibrium. Also, the functional form of the equilibrium price coincides with the one prevailing
in the imperfect information scenario with the possibility of intervention and low uncertainty,
given in Table 1. There, the equilibrium price does not depend on government’s insurance policy
since such an insurance is irrelevant when the of uncertainty faced by agents is low, whereas here
the government insurance parameter does not appear in the expression of the equilibrium price420
since there is no government whatsoever in the current framework.
Also, whereas changes in the level of uncertainty lead to discontinuous changes in prices in
the framework with the possibility of intervention, as given by Table 1, here such a discontinuity
is not present by virtue of the fact that a unique expression of the equilibrium price holds,
regardless of the level of τ . This implies that the possibility of government intervention creates425
an excess volatility in prices that would not exist otherwise.
4.2. Perfect Information About the Fundamentals
In the perfect information scenario, agents’ maximization problem is:
max
Xi
Xi (θ − p) +A (27)
s.t. A ≥ p if Xi = 1.
Therefore, in case agents can afford to buy the asset, A ≥ p, they choose Xi = 1 only if:
θ − p+A ≥ A
⇔ θ ≥ p. (28)
For later comparison, the constraint in (28) is taken to be binding, and therefore the equilib-430
rium price when agents have perfect information is given by:
pNGP = θ, (29)
which is the same as in the framework with the possibility of government intervention.
4.3. No Information: Common Prior About the Fundamentals
Finally, the focus turns to the case where agents do not receive any signal, being aware only
of the distribution of θ˜, given by θ˜ ∼ U [0, 1]. Agents’ problem is:435
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max
Xi
E
[
Xi
(
θ˜ − p
)
+A
]
= Xi
[
E
(
θ˜
)
− p
]
+A (30)
s.t. A ≥ p if Xi = 1.
With no possibility of intervention, it follows that:
E
(
θ˜
)
=
∫ 1
0
θdθ
=
1
2
. (31)
Therefore, in case agents can afford to buy the asset, A ≥ p, they choose Xi = 1 only if:
1
2
− p+A ≥ A
⇔
1
2
− p ≥ 0. (32)
If the constraint in (32) is binding, the equilibrium price is given by:
pNGC =
1
2
.
Hence, in the common prior scenario without the government, the equilibrium price is simply
the expected value of the random variable representing the payoff of the risky asset.440
4.4. Equilibrium Prices Across the Informational Scenarios
Given the equilibrium prices holding in each of the informational scenarios, namely pNG (im-
perfect), pNGP (perfect) and pNGC (common prior), the same analysis as in the framework with
the possibility of intervention is performed now, namely the intra framework, inter scenario com-
parison of Figure 2. The objective is, again, to assess the impact of information on equilibrium445
prices, taking into account that agents cannot rely on the government to absorb potential losses
from an investment in the risky asset.
The equilibrium prices are:
(i) Imperfect information: pNG = θ − τ ;
(ii) Perfect information: pNGP = θ;450
(iii) Common prior: pNGC = 1/2.
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Similarly to the analysis in the framework with the possibility of government intervention,
Proposition 5 in the appendix shows that exists θ and θ such that, for a high realization of θ,
i.e., θ ∈
[
θ, 1
]
, the ordering of equilibrium prices is:
pNGP > pNG ≥ pNGC , (33)
whereas for an intermediate level, i.e., θ ∈
[
θ, θ
)
:455
pNGP ≥ pNGC > pNG, (34)
and, finally, if the state of fundamentals is sufficiently low, i.e., θ ∈ (0, θ):
pNGC > pNGP > pNG. (35)
The ordering of equilibrium prices is, therefore, similar to the one obtained in the framework
with the possibility of intervention. Regardless of the realization of θ˜, it is always the case that
pNGP > pNG, i.e., the equilibrium price in the perfect information scenario is always higher
than the one prevailing when investors have imperfect information: better (perfect) information460
commands a higher price than worse (imperfect) information.
For a sufficiently low realization of the state of fundamentals, 0 < θ < 1/2, the unconditional
expected value assigned by the agents to the asset’s payoff, 1/2, is higher than the value one would
expect in both the perfect and imperfect information scenarios, thus higher is the equilibrium
price, pNGC , compared to what would be agreeable in the other scenarios. This argument is465
reversed for a sufficiently high state of fundamentals, i.e., for 1/2 + τ ≤ θ ≤ 1, in which case
pNGC is the lowest of the equilibrium prices.
The ranking of equilibrium prices shows that, even without concomitant changes in the state of
fundamentals, changes in the precision of information should cause changes in prices. Therefore,
the previous remark that changes in the informational scenario bring excess volatility in prices470
holds here as well.
5. Government vs No Government Prices
From the analysis of the two frameworks, i.e., with and without the possibility of government
intervention, across the different informational scenarios, i.e., imperfect, perfect and common
prior information, the conclusion is that, overall, prices respect the following order:475
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• For a sufficiently high realization of the state of fundamentals, the equilibrium price under
perfect information is the highest, whereas the lowest equilibrium price is reached in the
common prior scenario;
• For a moderate realization of the state of fundamentals, the perfect information scenario
leads to the highest price, whereas it is the imperfect information scenario that leads to480
the lowest;
• For a sufficiently low realization of the state of fundamentals, the equilibrium price in the
common prior scenario is the highest, whereas the lowest equilibrium price is reached in
the imperfect information scenario.
The possibility of government intervention, therefore, does not alter the ordering of equilib-485
rium prices, when a comparison is made across the different informational scenarios. The other
results that follow are:
• Changes in the information structure creates excess volatility by leading to changes in
prices even when the state of fundamentals remains constant;
• The possibility of intervention makes equilibrium prices to be more volatility, by inducing490
a discontinuity in prices when the level of uncertainty in the economy changes from low to
high in the imperfect information scenario;
• If the equilibrium price of the risky asset under the scenario of perfect information is
to be deemed as the fundamental one, situations where agents can rely only on minimal
information such as the distribution of fundamentals, positive bubbles exist when the state495
of fundamentals is low and negative bubbles when it is high.
Being an insurance, the possibility of government intervention should intuitively make equi-
librium prices higher than the equilibrium prices in the framework without the possibility of
intervention. This is the result obtained in turn by performing the inter framework, intra sce-
nario analysis of Figure 2.500
5.1. Imperfect Information
In the imperfect information scenario with the possibility of government intervention, the
equilibrium price depends on the uncertainty level faced by agents. From Table (1):
• pIP = θ +
[
A− C − 2
√
τ (A− C)
]
(high uncertainty);
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• pIP = θ − τ (low uncertainty).505
Without the possibility of intervention, the equilibrium price is, from (27), given by:
pNG = θ − τ. (36)
In the low uncertainty case, τ < A−C, the equilibrium price in the two frameworks coincide,
i.e., pIP = pNG. The reason is that, with low uncertainty, agents’ information is accurate enough
and allows them to decide whether to buy or not the risky asset regardless of the possibility of
intervention. In the high uncertainty scenario, however, the possibility of government intervention510
turns out to be essential in agents’ investment decision. Comparing the equilibrium prices across
the frameworks with and without intervention, one has:
pIP > pNG
⇔ τ2 − 2τ (A− C) + (A− C)2 > 0. (37)
By definition, under high uncertainty it holds that τ > A − C, which in turn implies (37)
being true, and hence pIP > pNG.
Therefore, combining the low and the high uncertainty cases, the equilibrium price is at515
least as high with the possibility of government intervention as it would be without. This
goes according to what one would expect, as government intervention represents an insurance
associated with the risky asset and as such should be reflected positively in the equilibrium price.
5.2. Perfect Information
In the perfect information scenario, the equilibrium price is the same in both frameworks,520
with and without the participation of the government, i.e.:
pPI = pNGP = θ. (38)
Recall that, in the framework with the possibility of intervention, the equilibrium price is
always such that the government ends up not intervening, and this is the reason why the equi-
librium price is identical to that in the framework without the possibility of intervention.
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5.3. Common Prior525
When agents only have knowledge of the distribution of the state of fundamentals, the equi-
librium price in the framework with the possibility of government intervention is given by:
pCP = 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (39)
whereas in the framework without the possibility of intervention it is:
pNGC = 1/2. (40)
It follows that:
pCP > pNGC
⇔ 1/2 >
√
2 (A− C)− (A− C) . (41)
The assumption that 0 < A− C < 1/2 and the fact that the right-hand side is increasing in530
A− C implies that (41) holds, and therefore pCP > pNGC .
The reason is straightforward: since agents do not receive any information regarding the
level of the state of fundamentals, all they calculate is the unconditional expectation of θ˜. In
the framework without the possibility of intervention, that expectation is taken over the whole
support of the distribution of θ˜, whereas in the framework with the possibility of intervention535
the support is truncated at the critical level of intervention, after all agents know that the payoff
of the asset will not be lower than that. This truncation makes the expected value of the state
of fundamentals higher in the framework with the possibility of intervention than in the one
without, and the same goes for the equilibrium prices.
5.4. Frameworks and Informational Scenarios Combined540
Combining the conclusions obtained after a comparison across frameworks of equilibrium
prices under each informational scenario, the main result is the following:
Proposition 2. Regardless of the informational scenario faced by investors being one of imper-
fect, perfect, or common prior information, the resulting equilibrium price is at least as high in
the framework with the possibility of intervention as in the one without.545
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6. Empirical Evidence
This section digresses on the main testable implications of the model, i.e., the ranking of equi-
librium prices under different informational scenarios as a function of the state of fundamentals,
and the positive effect of the possibility of government intervention on equilibrium prices.
6.1. Ranking of Equilibrium Prices550
The model asserts that equilibrium prices should respect a particular ordering according to
the realized state of fundamentals, and this should hold regardless of the possibility of government
intervention.
In order to test this hypothesis, it is used the FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data)
database from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to assemble the data used herein2. In555
particular, the series used are the Consumer Sentiment Index compiled by the University of
Michigan, and the Price Index for small, mid and large capitalization firms in the U.S. calculated
by Wilshire. All the data is publicly available.
The Consumer Sentiment Index is used as a proxy for the state of fundamentals and, as
such, the higher it is, the better the overall shape of the economy. The informational scenarios560
are proxied by the capitalization of U.S. firms, the assumption being that agents have more
information about a firm, the better capitalized the firm is. This leads to the perfect scenario
being associated to large capitalization firms, the imperfect scenario to mid capitalization firms,
and the common prior scenario to small capitalization firms.
Figure 6.1 shows the time series of the aforementioned data. The data is monthly, ranging565
from June, 1996, to March, 2014. The indexes’ values are scaled to 100 to the peak of the last
U.S. recession, which is December the 1st, 2007.
From visual inspection, the time series of the Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) appears to
have three breakdates. In order to test for multiple breaks, it is used the methodology developed
by Bai (1997). As discussed in Hansen (2001), the idea is that, if taken as a function of the570
breakdate, the mean square error will be at a local minimum near each break date.
Upon this idea, the following regression is run, taking each monthly data point in the range
from June, 1996, to March, 2014, as a potential break date:
CSIt = α+ βCSIt−1 + δdt + γxt + et, (42)
2http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
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Figure 5: Regressions’ mean square error as a function of the breakdate.
where CSIt stands for the Consumer Sentiment Index at date t, dt is the dummy variable
which equals 1 if t is after the breakdate and 0 otherwise, and xt = dt.CSIt−1 is the interaction575
term. Figure 5 plots the mean square error for all the regressions, as a function of each possible
breakdate.
There are three local minima, from which we take two as representing the breakdates of the
Consumer Sentiment Index3, namely November, 2000, and January, 2007. The breakdates are
plotted as dashed lines in Figure 6.1, dividing the Consumer Sentiment Index in three periods,580
according to which the state of fundamentals of the economy is properly defined:
• High state of fundamentals: from June, 1996, to November, 2000;
• Intermediate state of fundamentals: from December, 2000, to January, 2007;
• Low state of fundamentals: from February, 2007, to March, 2014.
3The other candidate was July, 2007, but, due to its proximity to the second breakdate, it was not considered
as such.
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Figure 6: Price Index of small, mid and large capitalization firms, and Consumer Sentiment Index.
Let pl denote the price index of large capitalizations firms, pm the price index of mid capital-585
ization firms, and ps the price index of small capitalization firms. The model developed in the
previous sections, together with the assumption that the higher the capitalization of firms, the
better the quality of the information about them, predicts the following ordering of prices, as a
function of the state of fundamentals:
• High state of fundamentals: pl > pm ≥ ps;590
• Intermediate state of fundamentals: pl ≥ ps > pm;
• Low state of fundamentals: ps > pl > pm.
To test the ordering of equilibrium prices, it is first checked whether the level of the state of
fundamentals has any impact on the difference among the price indices. For that, the following
regressions are run:595
∆pi,jt = α+ βd1t + γd2t + et, i, j = l,m, s (43)
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where ∆pi,jt = p
i − pj is the difference between the price index of firms with capitalization
levels i and j, d1t is the dummy variable for the first breakdate, and d2t for the second one.
The regressions’ results4 show that, for ∆pl,mt and ∆p
l,s
t , the coefficients β and γ are negative
and both significant at the 1% level, corroborating the model: as the state of the economy
deteriorates, so does the difference in the price index of large capitalization firms compared to600
that of mid and small ones. The time series of pm and ps are too close to each other, yielding
not significant results for ∆pm,st .
Another test performed is a comparison of means of ∆pi,jt , for each of the periods defined
by the breakdates. For the periods under the high and intermediate state of fundamentals,
respectively, the hypothesis that ∆pl,mt ≤ 0 and ∆p
l,s
t ≤ 0 can both be rejected at the 1% level.605
Therefore, in the high and intermediate state of fundamentals, it holds that pl > pm and pl > pm,
as predicted by the model. As before, the fact that the series of pm and ps track each other too
closely makes the results for ∆pm,st to be not significant.
On the other hand, for a comparison of means in the period corresponding to the low state
of fundamentals, both hypotheses that ∆pl,mt ≤ 0 and ∆p
l,s
t ≤ 0 can be rejected at the 1% level.610
Hence, the data shows that, under low fundamentals, pm > pl and ps > pl, and, whereas the
first inequality is not supported by the model, the second is. The hypothesis that ∆pm,st ≥ 0
can be rejected at the 1% level, corroborating the prediction that ps > pm when the state of
fundamentals is low.
6.2. Effects on Prices from the Possibility of Intervention615
According to Proposition 2, the possibility of government intervention should command higher
equilibrium prices regardless of the informational scenario under which agents make their deci-
sions. It is not straightforward to test this hypothesis, as it requires two assets similar in every
dimension other than the possibility of intervention.
To circumvent this problem, it is assumed that the government follows a too-big-to-fail policy620
for which only large capitalization firms are eligible, but not mid and small ones. Also, it is
assumed that the quality of information for large, mid and small capitalization firms is the same.
Under these assumptions, the model predicts that the price index of large firms, pl, should
be higher than the corresponding one of mid and small companies, pm and ps, respectively. Not
only that, given that the possibility of intervention is enjoyed only by large firms, the price index625
4The tables with the regression results are available upon request.
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of mid and small capitalization firms should track each other closely.
Because the uncertainty about the possibility of government intervention was resolved in
October 3, 2014, when the former U.S. President George W. Bush signed into law the Troubled
Asset Relief Form (Tarp)56, the relevant range for the analysis runs until that date point. Figure
6.1 depicts the data when the Tarp was signed into law (dotted line). It is clear from the630
picture that the price index of large capitalization firms was higher than that of mid and small
capitalization firms for most of the time, by a significant ammount.
The hypotheses that ∆pl,mt ≥ 0 and ∆p
l,s
t ≥ 0 cannot be rejected at the 1% level, confirming
the visual evidence that pl is significantly higher than both pm and ps. On the other hand, even
though the hypothesis that ∆pm,st < 0 cannot be rejected, the confidence interval for p
m
t − p
s
t is635
much tighter than that when the comparison is between the price index of large capitalization
firms and that of mid and small ones. Since the assumption is that only large capitalization
firms are eligible for a too-big-to-fail policy, this corroborates the predictions of the model that
the possibility of government intervention leads to higher equilibrium prices.
7. Concluding Remarks640
This paper studies the impact on equilibrium prices that would result from a policy whereby
the government provides free insurance against the fall of agents’ welfare below a particular level,
as opposed to a framework where the government is credible in its commitment to not intervene.
This problem is analyzed under different scenarios, with agents having different precision of
information in each of them.645
It is showed that regardless of a framework with or without the possibility of intervention,
the comparison of equilibrium prices across different informational scenarios respect a particular
ordering determined by the realized state of fundamentals. This ordering implies that changes in
the informational scenario faced by agents lead to changes in the equilibrium prices even without
changes in the underlying state of fundamentals, hence creating excess volatility in prices. By650
inducing a discontinuity in prices when the uncertainty of agents changes from low to high in a
scenario of imperfect information, the possibility of intervention makes prices to be even more
volatile.
5This intervention targeted mainly financial institutions, but in January, 2009, the government used $23.4
billion of the Tarp funds to create the Automotive Industry Finance Program, benefiting the three major U.S.
auto industry companies: GM, Chrysler and Ford.
6See http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg139.aspx.
29
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
If the fundamental price of the risky asset is assumed to be the one prevailing in a perfect
information scenario, situations where agents discard signals and instead base their investment655
decisions only on the probability distribution of the asset’s return lead to positive bubbles when
the realized state of fundamentals is high and negative bubbles when the realized state is low.
This implies that a policy whereby the government makes the market better informed should
have a positive effect in terms of a correction of prices.
Finally, by working as an insurance mechanism, the possibility of government intervention660
leads to an increase in prices, and this effect is verified regardless of the informational scenario
faced by the agents.
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Appendix725
A. Comparison of Equilibrium Prices across Different Scenarios in the Government
Intervention Framework
Proposition 3. In the framework with the possibility of government intervention and low un-
certainty scenario, i.e., 0 < τ < A− C < 1/2, and equilibrium prices given by:
(i) Imperfect information: pIP = θ − τ ;730
(ii) Perfect information: pPI = θ;
(iii) Common prior: pCP = 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
;
the following holds:
• For a sufficiently high level of the state of fundamentals, θ:
1 ≥ θ ≥ 1 +
[
τ +A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (44)
the ordering of equilibrium prices is:735
pPI > pIP ≥ pCP ; (45)
• For an intermediate level of θ:
1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
≤ θ < 1 +
[
τ +A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (46)
the ordering of equilibrium prices is:
pPI ≥ pCP > pIP ; (47)
• For a sufficiently low level of θ:
0 < θ < 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (48)
the ordering of equilibrium prices is:
pCP > pPI > pIP . (49)
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proof. Since τ > 0, it follows trivially that pPI > pIP . Comparing pIP to pCP one has:740
pIP ≥ pCP
⇔ θ ≥ 1 +
[
τ +A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
. (50)
Therefore, if (50) is satisfied, it follows that pPI > pIP ≥ pCP . Otherwise, pCP > pIP , and
it remains to compare pCP to pPI :
pPI ≥ pCP
⇔ θ ≥ 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
,
which implies that, for:
1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
≤ θ < 1 +
[
τ +A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (51)
the ranking of prices is pPI ≥ pCP > pIP .
Finally, the last case is when:745
0 < θ < 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (52)
and, from the above, it follows that pCP > pPI > pIP , completing the proof.
Proposition 4. In the framework with the possibility of government intervention and high un-
certainty scenario, i.e., 1/2 > τ > A− C > 0, and equilibrium prices given by:
(i) Imperfect information: pIP = θ +
[
A− C − 2
√
τ (A− C)
]
;
(ii) Perfect information: pPI = θ;750
(iii) Common prior: pCP = 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
;
the following holds:
• For a sufficiently high level of the state of fundamentals, θ:
1 ≥ θ ≥ 1 +
[
2
√
τ (A− C)−
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (53)
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the ordering of equilibrium prices is:
pPI > pIP ≥ pCP ; (54)
• For an intermediate level of θ:755
1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
≤ θ < 1 +
[
2
√
τ (A− C)−
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (55)
the ordering of equilibrium prices is:
pPI ≥ pCP > pIP ; (56)
• For a low level of θ:
0 < θ < 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (57)
the ordering of equilibrium prices is
pCP > pPI > pIP . (58)
proof. Comparing pPI to pIP , it follows that:
pPI > pIP
⇔ τ >
1
4
(A− C) , (59)
which trivially holds since, by assumption, τ > A − C. Therefore, pPI > pIP . Comparing760
pIP to pCP one has:
pIP ≥ pCP
⇔ θ ≥ 1 +
[
2
√
τ (A− C)−
√
2 (A− C)
]
. (60)
Therefore, if (60) is satisfied, it follows that pPI > pIP ≥ pCP . Otherwise, pCP > pIP and
then one has to compare pCP to pPI :
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pPI ≥ pCP
⇔ θ ≥ 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (61)
which implies that, for:
1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
≤ θ < 1 +
[
2
√
τ (A− C)−
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (62)
prices are ranked as pPI ≥ pCP > pIP .765
Finally, the last case is when:
0 < θ < 1 +
[
A− C −
√
2 (A− C)
]
, (63)
for which, using the above, pCP > pPI > pIP , completing the proof.
B. Comparison of Equilibrium Prices across Different Scenarios without Govern-
ment Intervention
Proposition 5. In the framework without the possibility of government intervention, with 0 <770
τ < 1/2 and equilibrium prices given by:
(i) Imperfect information: pNG = θ − τ ;
(ii) Perfect information: pNGP = θ;
(iii) Common prior: pNGC = 1/2.
the following holds:775
• For a high realization of θ:
1/2 + τ ≤ θ ≤ 1, (64)
the ordering of equilibrium prices is:
pNGP > pNG ≥ pNGC ; (65)
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• For an intermediate realization of θ:
1/2 ≤ θ < 1/2 + τ, (66)
the ordering of equilibrium prices is:
pNGP ≥ pNGC > pNG; (67)
• For a low realization of θ:780
0 < θ < 1/2, (68)
the ordering of equilibrium prices is:
pNGC > pNGP > pNG. (69)
proof. Since τ > 0, it holds trivially that pNGP > pNG. Comparing pNG to pNGC one has:
pNG ≥ pNGC
⇔ 1/2 + τ ≤ θ ≤ 1, (70)
and, therefore, if (70) is satisfied, it follows that pNGP > pNG ≥ pNGC . Otherwise one has
to compare pNGP to pNGC :
pNGP ≥ pNGC ,
⇔ θ ≥ 1/2 (71)
implying that, if 1/2 ≤ θ < 1/2 + τ , then pNGP ≥ pNGC > pNG.785
The last case is when 0 < θ < 1/2, which yields that pNGC > pNGP > pNG, completing the
proof.
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• Stata 12 results for:
∆pl,st = α+ βd1t + γd2t + et. (2)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Linear regression Number of obs = 214
F( 2, 211) = 195.70
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.6646
Root MSE = 10.737
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
dls | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [99% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
d1 | -15.69168 1.824365 -8.60 0.000 -20.4338 -10.94955
d2 | -21.44455 1.689045 -12.70 0.000 -25.83494 -17.05417
cons | 22.68945 1.435218 15.81 0.000 18.95885 26.42006
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dls = ∆pl,st , d1 = d1t, d2 = d2t and cons= α.
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• Stata 12 results for:
∆pm,st = α+ βd1t + γd2t + et. (3)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Linear regression Number of obs = 214
F( 2, 211) = 13.05
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.1253
Root MSE = 2.1728
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
dms | Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [99% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
d1 | .563522 .3282014 1.72 0.087 -.2895818 1.416626
d2 | -1.844422 .3733348 -4.94 0.000 -2.814842 -.8740014
cons | -1.0323 .1962605 -5.26 0.000 -1.542446 -.5221542
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dms = ∆pm,st , d1 = d1t, d2 = d2t and cons= α.
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• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pl,mt under a high state of fundamentals:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dlm | 54 23.72175 1.336433 9.820736 20.15104 27.29246
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dlm) t = 17.7501
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 53
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dlm = ∆pl,mt .
• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pl,st under a high state of fundamentals:
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dls | 54 22.68945 1.438505 10.57081 18.84602 26.53288
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dls) t = 15.7729
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 53
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dls = ∆pl,st .
4
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pm,st under a high state of fundamentals:
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dms | 54 -1.0323 .1967099 1.445516 -1.557874 -.5067261
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dms) t = -5.2478
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 53
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dms = ∆pm,st .
• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pl,mt under an intermediate state of funda-
mentals:
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dlm | 74 7.466553 .9008066 7.749031 5.084038 9.849069
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dlm) t = 8.2887
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 73
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dlm = ∆pl,mt .
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• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pl,st under an intermediate state of funda-
mentals:
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dls | 74 6.997776 1.125969 9.685948 4.019736 9.975815
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dls) t = 6.2149
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 73
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dls = ∆pl,st .
• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pm,st under an intermediate state of funda-
mentals:
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dms | 74 -.468778 .2629878 2.262306 -1.164346 .2267902
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dms) t = -1.7825
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 73
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0394 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0788 Pr(T > t) = 0.9606
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dms = ∆pm,st .
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• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pl,mt under a low state of fundamentals:
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dlm | 86 -12.13358 1.039217 9.637301 -14.87183 -9.395332
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dlm) t = -11.6757
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 85
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dlm = ∆pl,mt .
• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pl,st under a low state of fundamentals:
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dls | 86 -14.44678 1.257213 11.65892 -17.75943 -11.13413
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dls) t = -11.4911
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 85
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dls = ∆pl,st .
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• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pm,st under a low state of fundamentals:
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dms | 86 -2.3132 .2645962 2.453764 -3.010388 -1.616012
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dms) t = -8.7424
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 85
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dms = ∆pm,st .
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• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pl,mt under the possibility of government
intervention:
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dlm | 128 14.32422 1.044769 11.82022 11.59204 17.05639
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dlm) t = 13.7104
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 127
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dlm = ∆pl,mt .
• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pl,st under the possibility of government
intervention:
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dls | 128 13.6177 1.121823 12.69198 10.68403 16.55138
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dls) t = 12.1389
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 127
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dls = ∆pl,st .
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• Stata 12 results for the test of hypothesis of ∆pm,st under the possibility of government
intervention:
One-sample t test
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [99% Conf. Interval]
---------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
dms | 128 -.7065138 .1743722 1.972796 -1.162514 -.2505138
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mean = mean(dms) t = -4.0518
Ho: mean = 0 degrees of freedom = 127
Ha: mean < 0 Ha: mean != 0 Ha: mean > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0001 Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: dms = ∆pm,st .
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Highlights
• This paper studies the impact of information quality and government policy on
prices
• Information quality is shown to affect prices and cause excess volatility
• The possibility of government intervention during crises leads to an increase in prices
• Price indices’ data from large, mid and small capitalization firms support the model
1
